Abstract: We develop a model of social signalling of religiosity and cooperative behaviour in religious organizations. The model embeds a ritual-based religious organization in which signalling arises through the use of costly rituals, and a discipline-based religious organization in which such signalling occurs through the monitoring of past behaviour. We use this framework to contrast -positively and normatively-these two forms of social signalling. We show that ritual-based religions, while using a costly and wasteful signal, also imply a higher level of coordination of behaviour in social interactions and a higher incidence of mutual cooperation. Our welfare analysis suggests that communities are more likely to support a switch to a discipline-based religion if strategic complementarities are high, and if there is su¢ ciently high level of public information about social behaviour. This accords with the success of Calvin's Reformation in Switzerland and France, a process characterized by the reduction of rituals along with the creation of institutions to monitor and publicise individuals'behaviour, such as the Consistory. 1 We thank the editor and three anonymous referees for their comments. We also thank the ERC for …nancial support (grant no 210385).
Introduction
of social signals might induce di¤erent distributions of social behaviour and economic outcomes.
A community that relies on signalling by good behaviour might reap more bene…ts compared with one that uses a costly or a wasteful ritual. On the other hand, a costly ritual may do a better job at screening out individuals with low moral standards. Our aim in this paper is to compare these two mechanisms by focusing on their behavioural and normative implications.
This comparison is especially pertinent in the context of the Reformation of the Catholic church in the 16th century, and speci…cally that of Calvin in Geneva. In medieval times, the Catholic church had evolved to have an elaborate system of rent extraction and a heavy load of rituals. 6 In contrast, the reformers signi…cantly reduced the number of rituals or religious sacraments an individual had to attend. 7 In fact, Barro and McCleary (2003) show that to this day Catholics participate in more church rituals than Protestants.
Moreover, Calvin's Reformation in Geneva has shifted the church's emphasis to discipline.
In his second spell in the city, Calvin initiated the institution of the Consistory to monitor, discipline and publicise individuals' behaviour. 8 A great deal of its function was devoted to resolving civil disputes within families, between neighbours, and between business associates.
Deviant behaviour was punished by public scolding, sometimes by Calvin himself. When other communities in Switzerland and France decided to adopt Calvin's religion, he insisted on the formation of local Consistories, which are better suited to monitor local behaviour. In fact, Arrunada (2010) shows that to this day, Protestants better monitor each other's conduct compared with Catholics. 9 Calvin's emphasis on discipline -religious and civil alike-is evident in his insistence that discipline is the third mark of a good Church (this was objected to by Lutherans) and is certainly a mark of his own reign in Geneva. 10 While fear of punishment itself may trigger discipline and good behaviour, punishments for deviant behaviour often consisted of either public scolding or of being denied access to communion; the key element of the punishment was therefore its public nature (we provide a more detailed discussion of the Consistory and these issues in Section 5.1).
Finally, our welfare comparison is motivated by the explicit choice faced by city-states in Switzerland between the highly ritualistic Catholic church and Calvin's Reformation. In such autonomous city-states, the choice of which religion to adopt was often decided by a vote in the city council. There are many political and economic factors behind the decision to adopt the Reformation, and our welfare analysis highlights a new dimension along which the two 6 See Ekelund et al (1996 Ekelund et al ( , 2002 . 7 Calvin had rejected the seven sacraments of the Catholic church and accepted only two sacraments as valid (Baptism and the Lord's Supper). 8 An institution of the same name existed before but dealt mainly with marriage law. 9 McCleary (2007) also shows that Protestants tend to trust or place obligations on others as they do with family members. 1 0 We discuss the di¤erences between Calvin's Reformation and that of Luther in Section 6.2.
religions may be compared. 11 We analyse a simple model which allows us to consider both types of social signalling. The model is based on the premise that religions moderate cooperative behaviour and thus possibly induce enhanced material utility, through a spiritual dimension and a signalling method. 12 We assume that a population of individuals is randomly matched into pairs to play a Prisoners' Dilemma (with strategic complementarities). 13 Religious beliefs, heterogeneous and privately known, consist of a perceived spiritual bene…t from cooperative behaviour.
In a ritual-based religion, individuals can participate in costly and public rituals, and can condition their behaviour in the Prisoners'Dilemma game on whether their opponent participates as well. In a discipline-based religion, individuals'behaviour in an initial round of play is publicly observed. Individuals can then condition their subsequent behaviour on whether their opponents have behaved well in the past. The model allows for a spiritual as well as a material bene…t from cooperative behaviour. A spiritual bene…t arises in both religions due to religious beliefs. A material bene…t arises due to successful social signalling which elicits more cooperation from others.
In the ritual-based religion, the cost of the signal determines the level of participation in rituals. We show that the Pareto dominant level of rituals induces an accurate signal, that is, all those who participate in rituals also cooperate with one another. In the discipline-based religion, the cost of signalling -i.e., the loss from cooperation-is endogenous, and depends on the share of those that cooperate in the …rst period. We show that this induces a noisy signal in equilibrium, in which a relatively large share of individuals cooperate in the …rst period. These large initial cooperation levels accord with Weber's (1906) observations of the "probation" period for new members in the North American sects that descended from the Calvinistic theology. 14 We highlight a trade-o¤ between the accuracy of the signal and its cost. The ritual-based religion allows for a costly but an accurate signal. The discipline-based religion on the other hand induces excessive signalling, i.e., some agents who initially cooperate, defect later on to 1 1 Political factors such as the declined in ‡uence of the Roman church, or economic factors relating to urbanisation and the abuses of church power, are among the explanations for the Reformation. See Flick (1930) . 1 2 Wilson (2002) provides examples of the secular utility in the form of social order that religious institutions provide, from early Christianity o¤ering a mini-welfare state in the Roman Empire (see also Stark 1996) , through regulation of rice production in Indonesia, to modern US churches providing a social network to its members. 1 3 Numerous papers have analysed social norms when social interaction is modelled by a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Greif (1989) studies how cooperation arises due to repeated interactions. A recent literature has analysed cooperation when players sustain di¤erent norms; see for example Dixit (2003) , Tabellini (2008) , and Andreoni and Samuelson (2006) . 1 4 Weber (1906) writes: "And the Canonical limitation of the size of the unity, the congregation, to such dimensions that all members personally know one another and, therefore, can judge and supervise their "probation" reciprocally has always been a fundamental Baptist principle." take advantage of others. This leads individuals to be more suspicious and less cooperative in the second period. We show that the implication of this is that the ritual-based religion can achieve higher levels of mutual cooperation as well as higher total coordination in behaviour.
We then consider average material welfare and identify two environments in which the above trade-o¤ is resolved in favour of the discipline-based religion. We show that if strategic complementarities are su¢ ciently large, then both religions induce su¢ ciently similar and high levels of mutual cooperation, but the ritual-based religion is strictly costly and is thus dominated.
The discipline-based religion also dominates if cooperation is more bene…cial than coordination (so that even one-sided cooperation yields su¢ ciently large gains to society compared with mutual defection). In this case the accuracy and informativeness provided by the ritual-based religion is not valued enough, and moreover, the ritual cost must be high as individuals are keen to avoid mutual defection. If on the other hand coordination is su¢ ciently important, the ritual-based religion can dominate.
When we consider individual preferences, material and spiritual, we show that it is individuals with relatively weak beliefs that support a switch to a discipline-based religion. These are the individuals who enjoy the positive externalities that signalling by behaviour entails.
Furthermore, if some individuals prefer to maintain the ritual-based religion, they must include individuals of intermediate beliefs. Such individuals value the accuracy of the signal provided by the ritual-based religion which allows them to change their behaviour in response to others' signalling. We also show that the support for a discipline-based religion increases with the availability of public information. This result is consistent with the experience of Calvin's Reformation in Geneva (see Section 5.1).
Our analysis brings to the fore a way to distinguish religious organizations according to the type of social signalling they generate. To be sure, both types of signalling mechanisms that we analyse may be used in any religion. However, we argue that in terms of its focus, Calvin's reformation can be seen as a shift of emphasis from rituals to discipline. In this sense our work is in the spirit of Botticini and Eckstein (2005, 2007) who consider the transformation of Judaism from a religion based on sacri…ces in the Temple to a religion whose core is the reading of the Torah in synagogues, and Carvalho and Koyama (2011) who consider how religious restrictions change in response to growth. Complementary to our analysis is Glaeser and Glendon (1998) who compare the free will theology to the Weber's (1904) "Protestant work ethic"that induces individuals to focus on entrepreneurial actions that are more visible. 15 In contrast, we let both religions induce the same actions, and concentrate instead on the di¤erent social signalling methods and hence, in this sense, we follow Weber (1906) instead.
1 5 Kantas and Stefanadix (2010) focus instead on the comparison between pride-based moral code (such as Protestantism) and guilt-based moral code (such as Catholicism) and show that the former leads to a more favourable attitude towards work.
Our second contribution is to provide a framework for the positive and normative analysis of these two signalling mechanisms. This framework is based on the ritual-based religion we have analysed in Levy and Razin (2012) ; in that paper we have analysed a more general model of the ritual-based religion, with a greater focus on religious beliefs, including a dynamic version which allows for belief updating. The current paper simpli…es that model to embed an alternative signalling method in order to compare between the two. Given our discussion of the Reformation, religious organizations are a natural application to evaluate di¤erences in signalling methods, but our model and results can be interpreted more generally; for example, the literature on signalling wealth or status has also considered di¤erent signalling mechanisms, either by conspicuous consumption or by a productive activity such as charity giving. 16 Finally, our results can shed some light on recent empirical papers that have looked at the economic implications of the Catholic and the Protestant religions. Barro and McCleary (2003) show that economic growth responds positively to the extent of religious beliefs, notably those in hell and heaven, but negatively to church attendance. Our model shows that beliefs are indeed conducive for good economic outcomes and that costly and wasteful rituals are the main determinant behind the sometimes inferiority of the ritual-based religion. Guiso et al (2003 Guiso et al ( , 2006 show that religious beliefs are associated with more trust and better economic attitudes and that these e¤ects are larger for Protestants than for Catholics. 17 Becker and Woessmann (2009) suggest that literacy levels can explain the better economic outcomes of Protestant (mainly Lutheran) societies; literacy may be correlated with a higher level of public dissemination of information. Cantoni (2010) however …nds that overall, the growth of Lutheran and Catholic cities is roughly the same.
We present the model of the two religions in Section 2. We analyse the equilibria in Section 3. Comparative -positive and normative-analysis is presented in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss the Consistory in more detail and consider some supply side extensions. We discuss the potential link between theology and institutions and the comparison between Calvin and Luther in Section 6. All proofs are in the appendix.
A model of religious organizations
We present a model which embeds two religious organisations. Our aim is to make the two speci…cations as close as possible to one another so as to focus the comparison on the di¤erent signalling structures. We …rst present their common elements: the economic environment, religious beliefs and pay-o¤s.
1 6 For examples see Konrad and Glazer (1996) and Pesendorfer (1995) . 1 7 La Porta et al (1997) show that countries with hierarchical religions perform comparatively worse on a wide range of outcomes, which accords with Putnam (1993) who suggests that such religions deter formation of trust.
Economic environment and religious beliefs
The social interaction. There are two periods of interaction; in each period, individuals are randomly paired to play a Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game: We denote with the level of strategic complementarities,
Note that > 1 also implies that 2d > b; so that mutual cooperation is the e¢ cient outcome. For our welfare analysis, we distinguish between the case in which b > 2a; i.e., when one-sided cooperation is more socially e¢ cient than coordination, and the case of 2a > b, in which coordination of actions among agents is more important than cooperation.
Religious beliefs. To facilitate our analysis, we assume that in both religions, the theology instills beliefs that have similar e¤ects on behaviour: We assume that each individual i believes that if he cooperates he is rewarded with a spiritual bene…t i 0. 20 Such beliefs can be interpreted under both the free will and predestination doctrines in Christian Theology. Under the free will theology of the Catholic Church, good deeds a¤ect salvation. Di¤erent i types may therefore have a di¤erent perception of the bene…ts from salvation or alternatively the probability that private actions will a¤ect salvation. A richer model of Catholic Theology might allow for such rewards to be conditioned not only on good works but also on church obedience and participation in rituals; we discuss this in Section 6.1.
1 8 See for example Tabellini (2008) and references therein. 1 9 One can easily analyse the model under the alternative assumption of strategic substitutes; the model would then identify a need to signal one's willingness to defect, and in equilibrium, religious individuals would defect against each other. This goes against the empirical and experimental …ndings in the literature (see Sosis and Ru-e 2004 and Iannaccone 1998) .
2 0 The heterogeneity of types accords with evolutionary biology theories of the "religious mind". See Boyer (2002) .
In contrast, the theology of predestination implies that salvation is independent of the individual's good works. For Calvin, it is by God's grace that an individual will be salvaged. But as Weber (1904) suggested, good works can become a mean to self signal one's membership in the elect. A self-signalling mechanism can induce individuals to cooperate (motivated by the behavioural prescriptions put forward through the stories on Christ in the scriptures) in order to assure themselves that they belong to the elect. In a companion working paper, Levy and Razin (2011), we derive such a model which provides a self-signalling interpretation for the reduced-form beliefs/types i . 21
Pay-o¤s and the distribution over types: In any period of play, the utility of an individual will be the sum of the material and the spiritual utility. For example, the relative payo¤ of cooperation vs. defection is x + i ; where x 2 fd b; ag depends on opponents'
actions. It would be more interesting to concentrate on the strategic interaction of agents with types i a (as otherwise an agent would have a strictly dominant strategy to cooperate).
We then assume that with probability 1 < 1; an individual's type is drawn uniformly from Similarly to the reputation literature, we assume that the fraction of behavioural types is relatively small compared to the believers so that < and a > a for some ; a > 0: 22 A benchmark: Prior to introducing the possibility of signalling, we analyse the "autarky" benchmark of the two PD games, where no signalling arises. In other words, when individuals cannot condition their behaviour on any information:
Lemma 1: In the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium, there exists^ 2 (b d; a) such that all individuals i with i <^ defect and all those with i >^ cooperate in both periods of the PD games, where^ 0 ( ) < 0; lim !0^ ! a and^ solves
2 1 A recent literature has other, related, models of religious beliefs. Tirole (2006, 2011) assume that agents di¤er in their beliefs with respect to how much hard work is rewarded, in this or in the afterlife, and actively choose to maintain such beliefs. In Scheve and Stasavage (2006) on the other hand, religious beliefs allow for a psychic bene…t in bad times. Alaoui and Sandroni (2013) show an equivalence result between the utility functions of secular agents who have a moral obligation to accumulate wealth and those of religious agents who believe in Calvin's version of predestination. 2 2 is derived from the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2.
When no signalling arises, individuals either cooperate or defect disregarding how others behave. As there is a share of behavioural types who always cooperate, some type with high enough reward from cooperation will cooperate as well, and in particular the type at the cuto¤ is indi¤erent between cooperating and defecting when all types above him are cooperating and all types below him are defecting. Note however that when is small and speci…cally when ! 0, then^ ! a and no meaningful levels of cooperation can be sustained.
Signalling: rituals or discipline
Our model identi…es a need for social signalling to increase coordination on cooperative outcomes. We now describe two signalling methods. One signalling method allows for information about behaviour in the PD game to be transmitted across the periods of play. Another signalling technology allows only for information about auxiliary activities -such as rituals-to be available for players in the PD game.
Signalling by discipline. In this speci…cation we assume that in the second period, players have information on the …rst-period behaviour of their opponents. Players can use this information to make inferences about their opponents'religious types. We term a religion that has this (and only this) signalling technology a discipline-based religion (D). For now we assume that players are fully informed about the …rst period behaviour of opponents and in section 5.1 we consider lower levels of information.
Signalling by public rituals. In this speci…cation we assume that individuals can participate in a ritual which is costly and observable. The cost of the ritual is denoted by r 0: Players can then use the information on their opponents'choice of ritual participation to make inferences on their religious type. We term a religion that has this (and only this) signalling technology a ritual-based religion (R). To keep it simple, we assume that ritual participation can occur only once, prior to playing the two PD games. 23 For now we treat r as an exogeneous variable (we discuss supply side considerations in Section 5.2).
To recapitulate, the timing of the game is therefore as follows:
Period 0: In the R religion, individuals choose whether to pay r:
Period 1: Individuals are randomly matched with an opponent to play the PD game. In the R religion, before taking an action, they observe whether the opponent paid r:
Period 2: Individuals are randomly matched with a new opponent to play the PD game.
Before taking their action, in the R religion they observe whether the opponent had paid r; in the D religion they observe the opponent's Period 1 behaviour.
We assume no discounting; the payo¤ of an individual from the R religion is therefore her payo¤ from the PD games (material and spiritual), minus the cost of rituals if she chooses to participate, whereas the payo¤ of an individual in the D religion is her payo¤ in the two PD games. 24 Remark 1: use r to signal, which will mimick the R religion. At the other extreme, the value of r does not allow for meaningful signalling but information about …rst-period behaviour is available, which will mimick the D religion. In Section 5.3 and in Appendix B we analyse hybrid religions which involve both types of signalling technologies. We show that when both signals are used meaningfully, the gist of our results is maintained. We also discuss supply side considerations that might induce some religious leaders to choose one signalling institution rather than the other, and relate the choice of signalling methods to potential geographical and technological constraints, and to the di¤erent theologies.
Equilibria: We focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in each religion. It is in general true that when endogenous population signalling games are considered, the bene…t from signalling is not necessarily monotone in one's type, yielding equilibria with no generally de…ned charac-2 4 The choice of two interaction periods of the PD game is not an important assumption; it is the smallest number of periods that allows for signalling in the D religion, and for the sake of comparison we have the same number of interaction periods in each religion. As long as the information about past behaviour in the D religion is just about Period 1, all of our results could be easily extended to n periods of interaction. If this "probation period" is extended, the analysis becomes more complicated but qualitatively the results will have a similar nature.
teristics or with perverse forms of signalling. 25 In Levy and Razin (2012) we introduce a "belief activation" assumption which re…nes the set of social signalling equilibria to only monotone equilibria with potentially positive bene…ts from signalling behaviour. Such monotone equilibria imply that an individual who does not signal, i.e., does not participate in rituals in the R religion or defects in the …rst period in the D religion, will defect in all remaining PD games.
For the sake of simplifying the model we will henceforth restrict attention to such monotone equilibria. We provide the details of the re…nement in Appendix C.
Social signalling in the two religions
We start by describing the general features of equilibria in both models. We say that an agent does not signal if he does not pay r in the R religion, or defects in Period 1 in the D religion. In a monotone equilibrium, every agent who does not signal, indicates a clear intention to defect in the (remaining) PD games. This leaves us with only two types of equilibria, di¤ering in terms of the intentions to cooperate of those who do signal.
In an equilibrium with accurate signalling, all agents who signal in the "signalling period" also cooperate. That is, in R, all agents who pay r also cooperate in the PD games in periods 1 and 2, and in D, all those who cooperate in period 1, also cooperate in period 2.
An equilibrium with excessive signalling implies that signalling is noisy, so that some agents who signal actually defect. In this case, non-believers also engage in signalling, in order to take advantage of their good reputation and defect while gaining cooperation from others. This is summarised in the Lemma below: In the remaining PD game(s), all below 2 defect against all, all those in ( 2 ; a) cooperate with those who had signalled and defect against those who did not signal. Given 1 ; 2 is the unique solution to:
In the equilibria above, a spiritual as well as a material bene…t arises for social signalling.
A spiritual bene…t arises as individuals who signal also tend to cooperate which provides 2 5 For population games with signalling see Kranton (1996) To see how the material bene…t is determined in the excessive signalling equilibrium, note that, as in the autarky case, the cuto¤ type at 2 is indi¤erent between cooperating and defecting, and hence is determined according to the …xed point equation (1). In this equation,
is the share of those who had signalled and will cooperate against those who had done so as well, and
is the remaining share of those who had signalled but will defect. A unique solution arises with 2 < a so a material bene…t exists. Note that 2 is decreasing in 1 , i.e., when signalling becomes more excessive, agents are more suspicious and less willing to cooperate later on (speci…cally, when 1 = 0; then 2 =^ identi…ed in Lemma 1).
Finally, the cuto¤s 1 and will be determined according to the speci…c signalling method, which we analyse next.
Social signalling in the discipline-based religion
The next lemma characterizes the equilibria in the D religion.
Lemma 3: There exists a unique equilibrium, which is characterized by excessive signalling.
In the D religion the cost of signalling is endogenous and is determined by the measure of agents who cooperate in period 1. This, as we show in the appendix, implies that signalling must be excessive; all types above b d would rather pay the cost of cooperating, given the spiritual bene…t they gain from cooperation and future cooperation with the types above them.
To determine 1 ; the type who is indi¤erent between cooperating and defecting in the …rst period, note that the following …xed point equation has to be satis…ed:
The second period di¤erence in expected payo¤ between cooperating and defecting is composed of the bene…t from changing the behaviour of other agents to be cooperative, while planning to defect. The …rst period di¤erence is the endogenous cost of signalling by cooperation conditional on all above 1 cooperating. It is easy to show that given (1), 1 has a unique
Endogenous signalling pins down a unique excessive signalling equilibrium with period 1's discipline e¤ect of good behaviour, which induces even those below b d to cooperate. But this creates much lower cooperation levels in period 2 as believers are aware that some agents will defect and are thus less willing to cooperate themselves. The next example shows that this might imply that the average level of cooperation across the two periods is relatively low.
In Proposition 1 below we will generalize this result.
Example 1: Assume that the PD pay-o¤s are given by: C D C 3; 3 0; 4 D 4; 0 2; 2
In the limit, when ! 0; the equilibrium conditions (1) and (2) imply that 1 is close to 1 and 2 ' 1:5: The distribution over outcomes is reported in the tables below. For example, in the …rst period, mutual cooperation arises when a type above 1 meets another type above
The share of such meetings in the population is ( a 1 a ) 2 ' 0:25: Note that potentially, all believers (above b d = 1) might cooperate (i.e., in 25% of the matches). This is indeed the case in Period 1, but cooperation is substantially lower in period 2:
Social signalling in the ritual-based religion
In the ritual-based religion, the cost of signalling is exogeneous and is determined by r: 26 The following Lemma characterizes the equilibria in the R religion:
Lemma 4: For any 2 [0; a); there exists a ritual cost r so that all types above will participate in rituals.
If > b d; the equilibrium will be an accurate one, and otherwise it will be excessive. For equilibria with excessive signalling, the type at the cuto¤ 1 plans to defect against all. Paying r grants him the additional cooperation of all types in [ 2 ; a] : 27
2 is as determined in (1), and we can then …nd the r that will support this equilibrium. Note that higher levels of rituals must give rise to a lower 2 and as a result a higher 1 ; and thus serve to improve the informativeness of the signal.
2 6 For concreteness we assume that behavioural types, who always cooperate, also participate in rituals. This would also be the case if these types were rational. As the measure of behavioural types is small this assumption is without consequence to our results but simpli…es the exposition. 2 7 Note that the equilibrium is equivalent to an equilibrium in which a share 2 1 a of agents below 2 participate in rituals but defect, as in equilibrium all agents below 2 are indi¤erent between paying r or not.
For concreteness we describe this equilibrium as one with a cuto¤.
Consider now the accurate equilibrium, where for any cuto¤ b d; the relevant cost will satisfy:
The cost makes the cuto¤ type indi¤erent between paying r or not. Paying r has two e¤ects on an agent's behaviour in the two periods of play. First, he cooperates against all behavioural types instead of defecting, which provides a relative reward of d b + : Second, all types in
[ ; a] become cooperative, and he cooperates with them, which provides a relative reward of d a + : Clearly for any cuto¤ 2 [b d; a) we can …nd a cost level r which will support such an equilibrium.
Example 1 revisited: Consider again Example 1 and the accurate equilibrium with the largest participation, i.e., when = b d = 1: In the limit, when ! 0, r ' 2; and the distribution of play is reported below. Note that all the potential for mutual cooperation is realized:
As the level of r is exogeneous, for all parameters, a continuum of equilibria exist in the ritual-based religion. To facilitate our comparison with the discipline-based religion, we focus on one particular equilibrium, the accurate signalling equilibrium with the largest participation as described in Example 1 above. This equilibrium is in the closure of both the accurate and the excessive signalling sets. We can also show:
Lemma 5: The accurate equilibrium in which = b d and r = 2(1 )(
is the unique Pareto dominant equilibrium whenever there exists some strictly positive measure of agents who do not participate in rituals. 28 To see why this equilibrium is Pareto dominant, consider for example the set of all excessive signalling equilibria. In these equilibria, the price is determined by the marginal type who is indi¤erent between paying r or not conditional on defecting, but for those who do participate, the gain from participation in rituals is conditional upon cooperating, which by strategic complementarities is higher. It is therefore worthwhile for them to pay a higher price for a less noisy signal and higher cooperation. On the other hand, those who never participate in rituals or never cooperate have the same utility across all equilibria (namely the utility of being identi…ed and gaining cooperation only from behavioural types).
The equilibrium above allows us to identify the trade-o¤ between accuracy and cost; some of our results below extend to all values of r and the others will be robust to small deviations from r . Moreover, Pareto dominance may imply that religious leaders facing competition might wish to choose this level of rituals, and as we show in Section 5.2, in some environments, this equilibrium also maximises the revenue that can be extracted from agents from religious organization. Henceforth, in the R religion, we focus on the equilibrium described in Lemma 5.
Good works or rituals?
The above two organizations o¤er two di¤erent channels for individuals to publicly signal their religious convictions and their future behaviour. In this section we compare the equilibria of the two organizations in terms of the di¤erent distributions of behaviour they induce, and in terms of their normative implications.
We start by considering the positive implications of the two religions, where we compare behaviour in the two periods of the PD game in each religion. Next, we consider average material welfare, which also takes into consideration the cost of rituals. Average material welfare may be a relevant welfare criterion when one considers the long term survival of religious organizations. 29 There is also a substantial empirical literature looking at economic outcomes across countries with di¤erent religions and an analysis of average material welfare can possibly shed light on these di¤erent outcomes. 30 Finally, we look at individual preferences, which include both material and spiritual pay-o¤s. This normative analysis is more relevant when considering the political economy of religious reforms in communities. Indeed, the decision to switch alliances and adopt Calvin's Reformation in city states in Switzerland and communities in France was often taken by a vote in one or more City Councils. Calvin's eventual success to convince the Genevan council to tie the city to the Reformed Church hinged on the council members'approval. 31
The distribution of behaviour
As the signal in the ritual-based religion is fully accurate, it leads to full coordination among players (abstracting from the behavioural types). When believers meet each other, they have both signalled and will thus cooperate with each other. In all other matches, which involve at least one non-believer who had not signalled, the players will coordinate on mutual defection.
2 9 The evolutionary game theory literature often considers the survival of di¤erent preference types-measured by pure material pay-o¤s. Wilson (2002) advances the ideas of "group …tness" vis a vis individual …tness. 3 0 See for example Barro and McCleary (2003) , Guiso et al (2003 Guiso et al ( , 2006 and Cantoni (2010) . In contrast, in the discipline-based religion, signalling is excessive implying that some miscoordination will arise. In the next Proposition we show that the R religion leads to both higher coordination and higher mutual cooperation:
Proposition 1: There is a higher level of mutual cooperation and a higher level of total coordination (mutual cooperation and mutual defection) in the ritual-based religion.
The proof of Proposition 1 shows that in D, the additional cooperation in period 1, the "dis- We now turn to consider the implications of Proposition 1 for the welfare comparison between the two religions.
Average material welfare
The result above had indicated that the ritual-based religion provides not only accurate signalling, but also more instances of the socially e¢ cient outcome. We now show that this does not necessarily translate into higher social welfare.
In the next Proposition we focus on environments in which both religions o¤er similar behavioural prescriptions compared to the cost of rituals in the R religion, which implies that the latter is dominated. Speci…cally, when -the level of strategic complementarities, i.e., a b d -is large, there are relatively few non-believers compared with the population of believers. Intuitively, this implies that both religions easily generate mutual cooperation and so di¤erences between the two in terms of behaviour will be small. The cost of rituals on the other hand might be substantial. This cost is given by
and depends on the share of the believers, which is large for a large ; and on (b a); which is the value that non-believers place on taking advantage of believers. Thus, when is large and (b a) not too small, the D religion will dominate. This is formalized in the following Proposition (which can be generalized to other values of r).
Proposition 2: For any " > 0; there exists a " > 0; such that for all > " ; either (i) the discipline-based religion induces a strictly higher average material welfare compared with the ritual-based religion or (ii) the di¤ erence in average welfare between the two religions is smaller than ".
We now analyse the case in which the di¤erence in behaviour is not marginal, and the tradeo¤ between the religions in terms of accuracy versus cost is more strongly manifested. In R, in the limit when ! 0; ' 0:1 and r ' 0:58; which is paid by almost the whole population, and the distribution of play is close to:
Average welfare is 2(0:94(3:9) + 0:06(3:7)) (0:98)(0:58) = 7:2: In D, there is a large degree of cooperation in period 1 as 1 ' 0:1: But as even the small degree of non-believers defecting snowballs to substantially deter cooperation in period 2, 2 ' 2:5; so that only 10% of outcomes end in mutual cooperation:
Average welfare is 2(0:52(3:9) + 0:24(3:7) + 0:24(2)) ' 6:8 and thus D is dominated; the cost of R is relatively low and in addition D creates a substantial level of one-sided cooperation which is su¢ ciently inferior, socially, compared to any other outcome.
Individual preferences
We now consider individual preferences. We …nd the following results. Note that RD ( ) is composed of a material relative bene…t and a spiritual relative bene…t.
The material relative bene…t is …xed for all types that behave in the same way and elicit the same behaviour from others. On the other hand, the spiritual relative bene…t is the di¤erence in the probabilities with which one cooperates in the two religions, multiplied by the bene…t from cooperation, : It is therefore positive and increasing in over an interval in which agents cooperate more often in R and negative and decreasing in otherwise.
When is su¢ ciently large (for example, when ! 0; we need > 0 ! 2) so that the share of believers is large, types in [b d; 2 ] cooperate on average more often in R; in R they cooperate vis a vis all believers (and thus with a relatively high probability), whereas in D they cooperate with all in the …rst period but with no one in the second period. Thus, the higher the in this region, the higher is the spiritual relative bene…t from R. As the material relative bene…t is …xed in this interval this implies that RD ( ) increases. Consider …rst the types with weak beliefs, or non believers, who do not signal in any religion.
In R all types (besides the behavioural ones) identify them as they do not participate in rituals.
But in D many cooperate with them in the …rst period due to the discipline e¤ect, which induces them to prefer D. This e¤ect arises as D is based on a signal which provides positive externalities to others (note that this result holds for all r).
If is too low, then RD ( ) decreases for all ; which by the above implies that all individuals support D. This is the case for the parameters of Example 1. When is su¢ ciently large, by
Lemma 6, some individuals may prefer R. Moreover, the type at 2 will be its strongest supporter. As he cooperates more in R, he will have a higher spiritual payo¤ there. But also his material payo¤ might be higher, as the accurate signal in R allows him to better protect himself against defectors compared to the signal in D. This is the case for the parameters of prefer R, which constitutes 88% of the population.
One may wonder how individual preferences interact with average material welfare. For example, based on their material and spiritual welfare and a simple majority rule, would individuals choose environments which also yield higher material welfare for their community?
In Examples 1 and 2 this was the case. Example 3 considers parameters (namely a and d)
which are between Examples 1 and 2 and shows that this can fail. and we …nd that average material utility is higher in the D religion. However, in this case, 0 = 1 and 00 = a so that all individuals above = 1 which represent 66% of the population would prefer R. Any voting rule or political process which will give voice to such a supermajority will create some stickiness towards the less socially e¢ cient ritual-based religion.
Remark 2: Our model abstracts away from comparisons related to speci…c religious beliefs.
One consideration when comparing across religions might be how individuals forecast changes in their beliefs. The analysis above is suitable for the case in which individuals believe that the relative strength of their religious beliefs, if society switches between religions, will remain the same. That is, what is important is that their relative ordering in society remains the same.
This accords with the evolutionary biology idea of a "religious mind" or a "religious gene" which is distributed in society and can adapt to di¤erent religious systems. 33
Supply side considerations
In this Section we discuss possible extensions of the model, focusing on the supply side of religious organizations.
The Consistory and the value of information
We now provide more speci…c details about the Consistory and then extend the model to consider comparative statics on the technology of public monitoring. Our discussion below is based on Kingdom (1992) , Dommen and Bratt (2007) , McGrath (1990) and Wilson (2002) .
In 1541, upon his return to Geneva from exile in Strasbourg, Calvin had become convinced of the need for a disciplined and well-ordered church. In his letter to the city Council, Calvin Re-establish there pure discipline". 34
Calvin drew up the structure of his well-ordered church in the Ecclesiastical Ordinances (1541). The most distinctive and controversial aspect of this organization was the Consistory.
It was formed in 1542, "their o¢ ce is to have oversight of the life of everyone...there were to be twelve of them, chosen from the members of the three councils, to keep an eye on everybody". 35 The main objection to this body by the city council was because it feared that the line between ecclesiastical and civil matters would be crossed. Indeed, a great deal of its function was devoted to resolving disputes within families, neighbours, and among business associates.
Robert Kingdom who analyses the registrars of the Consistory, writes: "A number of times businessmen were called in and questioned about complicated deals involving loans of money..and those found guilty of usury were subject to harsh penalties in an e¤ ort to form ethical business practice...At the end the consistory was extremely successful in achieving discipline". The
Consistory's normal cases ended with either an admonition or a remonstrance, a kind of public scolding delivered by one of the ministers, usually Calvin himself. Some of the cases ended with excommunication, which denied access to one of the four annual communion services in Geneva.
In Calvin's attempt to spread his in ‡uence into France, he supplied pastors that were trained in Geneva, but insisted that local churches elect local Consistories. The consistorial structure was made obligatory by the Venerable Company of Pastors in 1557; In 1562, the number of local consistories in France had risen to 1785. The fact that elders and deacons were to be provided locally indicates that the consistory had an important role in monitoring, gathering and disseminating information, an activity best done by locals. Thus, although Calvin was striving for strong control of the church over individuals' and pastors' daily life, his most important institution was a local, decentralized, one.
The discussion above illustrates that the decision to invest in a Consistory, or to create a culture of monitoring, may be a concrete choice by religious leaders. To be sure, such an investment may be costly, and the e¤ectiveness of the Consistory may also depend on other exogeneous conditions such as urbanization or literacy levels.
To look at the e¤ect of public information let the parameter 2 [0; 1] measure the probability that …rst period information is observed. Thus, with probability the PD game in period 2 proceeds with information about Period 1, whereas with probability 1 the game proceeds with no information which takes us back to the equilibrium in the autarky benchmark of Lemma 1. The result below establishes that the higher is , the more signalling arises in the …rst period (as the value of signalling is higher), implying excessive signalling for su¢ ciently high : We also show how the individual support for D is a¤ected by : Note that all agents who defect in D always prefer a lower as then more miscoordination arises. Moreover, agents who defect both in D and in R would prefer D to R for any ; as in R they do not bene…t at all from signalling while in D they always face some miscoordination.
We also show that an increase in information does not necessarily increase the support in the population for D, and in particular that when is su¢ ciently small, an increase in may imply that more agents actually prefer R. To see why, note that when ! 0; we have that !^ :
But a small increase in implies that the utility from D for all agents below decreases; these agents always defect in D and a higher implies that accurate signalling arises more often (where others can screen them out). If is small enough and hence ( ) !0 su¢ ciently large, a large share of agents becomes worse o¤ in D with more information. However, globally, when increases su¢ ciently, the support for D increases. This arises as believers and in particular those with strong enough beliefs will switch to prefer D once enough cooperation and signalling levels are guaranteed.
The Proposition indicates that religious beliefs alone may not be su¢ cient to convince individuals to adopt the Calvinistic religion and that a su¢ cient level of public monitoring needs to be provided for societies to switch to D. Note that Calvin was successful in Geneva only in his second spell in the city, when he initiated the Consistory, which supports the above result.
It is also interesting to note that in Strasbourg, Zurich and Basel, the city councils did not give the church the power over excommunication and no Consistory was created despite attempts of Reformers such as Martin Bucer; the result above may also shed light on why these other attempts of the Reformation which had similar theological systems, reduced the role of rituals, but created no consistories, had initially failed.
The choice of rituals
We have looked above at the possibility of religious leaders designing the mechanism of monitoring behaviour; naturally, how one models the cost of such a monitoring institution will a¤ect the choice of these leaders, while the bene…ts, at least at the time of the Reformation, could be captured by the degree of participation or the success of shifting a society from a ritual-based to a discipline-based organization.
The choice of religious leaders in the ritual-based religion may be more straightforward. Such leaders need to determine the level of rituals. They may maximize participation, or revenues from the religion, if some of the cost of rituals can be extracted as actual rent. We now show that in some environments, the equilibrium with accurate signalling and largest participation will also be chosen by a religious leader who maximises r( + (1 )(1 (r) a )); where (r) is either in an accurate signalling equilibrium or 1 in an excessive signalling equilibrium:
Proposition 6: (i) In the set of excessive equilibria, the higher is 1 the higher are the revenues from the ritual-based religion; (ii) In the set of accurate equilibria, when is low enough, the lower is the higher are the revenues from the ritual-based religion.
Together, (i) and (ii) imply that the cost of rituals characterized in Lemma 5 may be chosen by religious leaders who maximize revenues. To see the intuition, consider …rst the set of accurate equilibria. When is low enough, when r increases, it is also the case that decreases; a higher fee implies then that more types need to change their behaviour. Thus decreasing increases both the demand for rituals and its price, which implies that the religious leader will choose the lowest possible ; i.e., = b d: In the set of excessive signalling, even though whenever r increases the demand for rituals also decreases, it is also the case that r has to be substantially lower to attract the non-believers, and such elasticity implies that revenues are maximized when r is highest in this set.
Remark 3: Note that we have assumed that ritual cost is equal for all. It is possible to analyse a model and maintain the general results when the cost of rituals has an individual component depending on ; as perhaps some individuals …nd the rituals intrinsically bene…cial.
We have also assumed that the rituals are a deadweight loss to society. Suppose instead that the ritual cost represents some monetary or charity element that can be redistributed back to some of the members of the community, if the church chooses to do so. This e¤ectively will lower the cost of participation for the members on the receiving end, taking us back to the case of heterogeneous cost which can be analysed as discussed above.
Emphasis on rituals or discipline
So far, we have focused on the extreme cases of religious organizations that either provide signalling by rituals or by monitoring of behaviour. Most religions will probably use a mixture of both signals. In the appendix we formalise and analyse equilibria in a model with such a hybrid religion; we show that the gist of our results is maintained and thus it is su¢ cient to focus on the extreme cases.
We now discuss how di¤erent factors might imply that some religious organisations will put more emphasis on particular types of signalling technologies. First, the choice of the signalling mechanism might be related to the evolution of the religious market. In a ritual-based religion, religious leaders may be able to extract some rent or appropriate some portion of the cost of rituals. When they have monopoly power, they might therefore prefer to stick to social coordination via rituals. In the appendix we revisit Examples 1 and 2 and show that when hybrid religions exist, a religion that fully focuses on rituals generates the highest revenues to the church.
It is also reasonable from the point of view of reformers to abolish rituals and focus on discipline; one of the main explanations for the success of the Reformation is the high costs of Catholic rituals (for example see Ekelund et al 2002) . The process of urbanization increased professionalism which implied that in terms of opportunity costs, rituals as well as rent extrac-tion by the church became more costly. The reformers had to break away with old practices and speci…cally those that were costliest to the believers.
Second, geographical considerations and the constraints on information transmission may also a¤ect the organisation of religious life. For example, subtle information on past behaviour might be harder to exchange when considering trade between villages, cities or countries, whereas rituals with physical attributes such as clothes, language, and participation in sermons, may be more easily transmitted across distant locations. With more dense population in cities, monitoring of discipline may become easier. The urban population is also more literate and hence may make dissemination of subtle information more viable. Finally, advancement in the technology of transmitting information, such as the advent of printing, might a¤ect the decision of religious leaders to shift emphasis to a more discipline-based organisation.
Below we also discuss how the theology may be related to religious institutions in general and the signalling mechanisms in particular; this implies that religions will focus on some form of signalling which …ts best their theology instead of choosing a mixture.
6 Discussion and conclusion 
Theologies and institutions
To facilitate our analysis we have abstracted from di¤erences in theologies and assumed that both religions motivate good works in the same way. But di¤erent theologies might a¤ect individuals'beliefs through di¤erent psychological channels and might not be easily compared.
For example, the self-signalling interpretation by Weber (1904) of Calvinistic beliefs might induce incentives for good works but such a mechanism is rather indirect. Also, Luther and Calvin encouraged their supporters to go back to the scriptures and to read the Bible by themselves (enabled by the advent of printing and higher levels of literacy), and this may lead to weaker or stronger beliefs than when one participates in rituals conducted by priests, depending both on the individuals and the priests in question. On the other hand, mechanisms such as forgiveness and indulgences (the system of exchange between money and redemption) that have evolved in the Catholic church might erode the connection between beliefs and good works to some degree. It would be interesting to analyse these more nuanced systems of beliefs.
We note though that the di¤erences between these two theologies might be consistent with the di¤erences in the institutional structure (although the causality between institutions and theology is not obvious). Speci…cally, in the Catholic church, good works alone do not su¢ ce;
according to Thomas Aquinas, three are required for salvation: direct reliance on the church and its sacraments, the free turning of the will to God and away from sin, and the remission of the guilt incurred by sin by priestly absolution. 36 In medieval times, this had evolved into a heavy load of public rituals and an impressive system of rent extraction. More generally, this theology easily lands itself to a hierarchical structure in which priests have to certify which actions provide rewards and can possibly deliver forgiveness. In the absence of free will, such a role of the Church's hierarchy, which is reinforced by rituals, is reduced.
Calvin vs. Luther
We have focused on Calvin's Reformation and not on Martin Luther's. Luther di¤ers from
Calvin both in terms of his theology and in terms of his general attitude towards the relation between Church and morality.
In terms of theology, while Calvin advocates justi…cation by the grace of God, Luther focuses on justi…cation by faith: "It is faith in Christ which makes him live in me and move in me and act in me...faith receives Christ's good works; love performs good works for the neighbours" In terms of the institutional structure of the Church, Luther has created no institutions, let alone the Consistory, and discipline was not considered an issue for the Church. In 1530, in the Confession of Augsburg, Luterhans insisted that there are only two marks of a true church: the church is the assembly of saints in which the gospel is taught purely and the sacraments are administered rightly. In particular, there is no requirement of good behaviour, which Calvinists considered as the third mark of a good Church. 37
Geneva before Calvin
Our analysis indicates that the discipline-based religion is more likely to be adopted when monitoring and information dissemination institutions arise (see Proposition 5). We have argued above that this could explain why Calvin was only successful in his second tenure in Geneva, when he created the Consistory. Also, urbanization and increased literacy levels which is correlated with urban professionalism, have both enabled the dissemination of more subtle information and have made Calvinism more attractive in line with our results.
Propositions 3 and 4 indicate that discipline-based religions are more likely to be successful when strategic complementarities are large enough and when cooperation is more important than coordination. While an empirical analysis that tackles this question is beyond the scope of our analysis, it is clear that cooperation was much in demand in Geneva in the pre-Calvin times. McGarth (1990) describes the city as being in decay, exhibiting reduced morality, and in need in some reformation, not only religious but social, political and economic. Wilson (2002) writes more speci…cally: "By Calvin's own account, his primary challenge was to unite the fractious city of Geneva in to an e¤ ective corporate unit...Geneva also had an infrastructure and the burden of supporting it was probably greater for the average citizen than now...a massive wall around the city had to be maintained, the swiss mercenaries that protected Geneva from the duchy of savoy had to be paid, a plague hospital had to be build, charity had to be given to the poor, an educational system had to be built, the list of public goods goes on and on.
The temptation to avoid the burden must have been great, not to speak of subverting the entire system."
Rituals vs. discipline in other religions
While our leading example in the paper is that of the Calvin's Reformation other religious organisations share similar attributes. In this Section we discuss a few examples.
The Orthodox church and the Old Believers
With some similarity to the Reformation, in 1666 the Old Believers separated from the Orthodox church after the reforms of Patriarch Nikon which introduced a number of ritual and textual revisions with the aim of achieving uniformity between Russian and Greek Orthodox practices. The Old believers have been compared to Calvin's reformation in Geneva and to its successors the Quakers and Baptist sects, both in terms organisation and economic achievements. 38 Several papers analyse their contribution to the rise of private industrial enterprise in early nineteenth-century Russia and in particular their role in the success of the Moscow textile industry (see Blackwell 1965 and Raskov 2012) . Old believer communities still exist today. The following is an example of the public scrutiny of behaviour in a community of Old Believers in Oregon, USA: 39 "In recent years, the nastayatyel has been increasingly called on to administer punishments and other forms of discipline to miscreant young people.
These punishments usually consist of a public announcement of the individual's sins to the congregation at the end of the service, whereupon the transgressors may be compelled to perform several prostrations before the congregation, or some other act of contrition and penance".
Islam and Ismailies
Islam is a religion with a large number of costly (many of them observable) rituals including daily prayers, fasting in the month of the Ramadhan, and the hajj to Mecca. The Ismaili branch of Shia Islam however, has fewer rituals 40 and moreover, around the 17th century, the Ismailis have created social structures similar to Calvinist sects. Speci…cally, two institutions were created: the Jamat, an assembly in the council of all the adult males, and the Jamat Khana, a council hall or guildhall of the community. There is a large literature in Sociology comparing these institutions and the Ismaili sect to Calvinist ones. Clarke (1976) describes the practice of these institutions in Britain as mixing the secular and the religious: "The role of the Jamat is multiple..it is well nigh impossible for an ismaili to make a meaningful distinction between the religious and the social. The jamat is regarded as a community centre which serves as a variety of purposes..a conciliar system of organization and administration is now operative which is similar to that of Calvinism...".
Similarly, Bocock (1971) , analysing the large Ismaili community in Tansania, describes features as in Calvinism such as the abundance of local leaders, and the role of the religion in monitoring secular a¤airs: "Unlike the pope, the Imam is not surrounded by a large structure with full time priests and bishops sta¢ ng it, but can choose local leaders himself...A local community of ismailies govern their own secular a¤ airs and meet for worship every day..this is similar to some of the organizational forms among calvinists, or calvinist in ‡uenced groups such as congregationalists, quakers, baptists".
Finally, Goldthorpe (1996) stresses the discipline element: "Both [calvinist and ismaili] religions were notably congregational in their form of organization, and the local community of Ismailis who met daily in the Jamat Khan, the Ismaili mosque, constituted also a community exercising moral control over its members, and providing them -when in good standing -with mutual aid and credit networks".
Other institutions supporting cooperation
We have advocated a view of religious organizations as enabling cooperation through a system of beliefs which induce preferences for cooperation, and an organizational structure that allows for the signalling of these preferences. There is a vast literature in Economics analysing how cooperation can arise in situations such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and our analysis is complementary to this literature.
One large literature concerns how cooperation might arise when groups are involved in repeated interactions. The scope for cooperation in these environments is constrained by discounting of future pay-o¤s and by the size of the community. In addition, Greif (1989) shows that even within the repeated game literature religious organizations have a role; speci…cally, they allow to create coalitions which are not too large and which are conducive to both information transmission and enforcement of punishments. Our results are complementary to these. We focus instead on environments in which cooperation per se is less of an issue, as some individuals are motivated to cooperate by their religious beliefs, and show how religious organisations use this starting point to induce higher levels of cooperation.
A second type of literature assumes that agents have preferences for cooperation (e.g., Tabellini 2008 ) and analyses the conditions for their evolution. Greif and Tabellini (2010) focus on the evolution of cooperation towards kin vs indiscriminate cooperation. In their dichotomy, clans have strong morality and rely on repeated games while cities have looser morality but rely on institutions. Our analysis is related to this as we also combine preferences for cooperation in an institutional set up, albeit both preferences and institutions are provided by the religion.
Finally, it may be argued that when state capacity is developed, institutions and legal courts are su¢ cient to promote cooperation as they allow enforcement of contracts. This might imply that these institutions will crowd out religion in its role of facilitating cooperation.
The literature on contract theory has however also noted that there are intrinsic problems in enforceability of contracts even in the presence of symmetric information; e.g., imperfect veri…ability or the inability to describe complicated scenarios. Equilibrium behaviour as in our model is naturally immune to such problems. 41 7 Appendix 7.1 Appendix A: Proofs Proof of Lemma 1: As agents can cooperate or defect without any other conditions, the equilibrium must be a cuto¤ equilibrium as described in the Lemma. To show that such an equilibrium exists, note that if we set^ = a then the LHS is positive for any > 0, while if we set^ = 0; then the LHS is negative, and thus there will be a cuto¤^ : Moreover, the LHS is monotone in^ which will imply uniqueness.
Proof of Lemma 2: By monotonicity of beliefs, if a cuto¤ type signals at ; all above with 0 > will wish to signal as well, at least weakly. This implies that the only monotone equilibria are as described in the Lemma. To see that (1) has a unique solution, note that it implies,
Proof of Lemma 3: We will now consider existence and uniqueness for the excessive signalling equilibrium in D. The …xed point equation for 1 is:
where 2 is given by
Note that from the above 2 is monotonically decreasing in 1 :
Suppose that 1 = 0: Then On the other hand at 1 = b d from (*) and (**) we have
and the LHS of (*) becomes,
So a value of 1 satisfying (*) exists and is the solution to the two equations. To see the uniqueness of a solution note that using (*) and (**) we get,
Note that this expression is monotone in 1 ; @LHS
which insures uniqueness. We now show that there is no accurate equilibrium. The …xed point equation for is:
Therefore if the derivative with respect to is monotone we will not have such an equilibrium; the derivative of the lhs of (***) after some manipulation is
Note that this expression is decreasing in : Therefore it is either …rst positive and then negative or always negative. In either case an equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Lemma 4:
The equations for the equilibrium cost of rituals are provided in the text from which it is clear to see that for any ; a ritual cost can support this as a signalling cuto¤ in the …rst period. 42
Proof of Lemma 5: Consider an equilibrium with excessive signalling which is characterized by,
Note that higher levels of rituals must give rise to a lower 2 and as a result a higher 1 ; and thus serve to improve the content of the signal.
Let us compare this equilibrium to one in which r = 2(1 )( a b+d a )(b a); i.e., an accurate equilibrium with = b d. Remember that r > r: Note that all those that did not pay r, or that defect (are below 2 ), are indi¤erent among these r 0 s as their net utility when they either pay or not pay for rituals is b + (1 )a per period: On the other hand, all agents above 2 ;
have a higher utility when r increases to r . To see why, note that 2 decreases to ; and thus they receive, for the interval of change [ ; 2 ]; a relative bene…t of (1 )
period in the equilibrium with r ; where (1 ) d 0 a represent the di¤erence in material pay-o¤ from the PD game whereas (1 )
represents the increase in the payment from r to r (per period). Finally, these types have another increase in their utility as when 1 increases, they defect against more agents who defect against them which provides them a higher utility according to their beliefs. Therefore, all excessive signalling equilibria are Pareto dominated by the equilibrium with r :
Now let us now look at r which sustains accurate signalling, i.e., 0 2 (b d; a). Those who do not pay r gain the same utility b + (1 )a per period, whereas types > 1 who pay r;
The utility of agents above 0 as a function of is
per period. The derivative w.r.t 0 for some type is
which is satis…ed as 0 < < a: Therefore, all these types prefer a religion with a lower cuto¤ and again any such equilibrium will be Pareto dominated by the equilibrium with r .
Proof of Proposition 1:
We start with the following helpful Lemma.
Lemma A1 (i) There is more mutual cooperation in R i¤
then there is more total coordination in the R religion.
Proof of Lemma A1:
(i) Mutual cooperation in the R religion is 2(1 1 ) 2 where it is (1
(ii) Total miscoordination in the R religion is given by 2 1 : In the D religion miscoordination is larger than (
We now prove the Proposition. In particular we prove that the statement is true when is small enough, uniformly for the parameters of the model. We therefore consider a convergent sequence of parameters fa n ; b n ; d n g 1 n=1 and a sequence f m g 1 m=1 such that lim m!1 m = 0. Let n = an bn dn : By Lemma 2, for any m and n; there is a unique equilibrium, ( n;m 1 ; n;m 2 ). Equilibrium equations are,
There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: Suppose that n ! n!1 1: The second equilibrium equation can be written as, This implies that for any > 1 there exists a > 0 such that for any > and < ; and so there is more mutual cooperation in the R religion.
Case 2(ii): Suppose that (1 n;m 1 (bn dn) ) ! n!1 > 0: Using the second equation we get, n;m 2 a n =
(1 n;m 1
But looking at the …rst equation as n ! 1:
Where we have substituted the following equations,
(1 n;m 1 a n ) = lim n!1
(1
But note that in (3) for high enough m this equation cannot hold as it is negative. Therefore this case cannot arise for large enough m:
To conclude the proof of this part we choose < minf 0 ; g:
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose that n ! n!1 1: By the second equilibrium equation, we have that lim n!1 n;m 2 a n = lim n!1
As n ! n!1 1 and n;m 1 < (b n d n ) (by Lemma 1) we have that lim n!1 n;m 1 a n = 0
Thus, in both religions, for high enough n; cooperation is almost full. However, r n;m = 2((1 m )(1 bn dn an )(b n a n )) > 0 when b d a 9 1. Therefore, either the D religion is strictly preferred, for high enough n; or they converge to yield the same average welfare. 
Proof of Proposition
RD is decreasing in in this region. This is true as 1 < b d: Consider now types in (0; 1 ):
Consider types in ( 1 ; b d) : they have the same utility in R as the types below but a higher utility in D from their own point of view. Hence
must be lower and decreasing.
Speci…cally: a )); as their type a¤ects their spiritual utility in the order of the probability by which they are cooperating: Their utility from D di¤ers only in the spiritual payo¤ that accrue in the …rst period with probability one. Thus we have,
This may be increasing or decreasing, depending on the sign of 
We can repeat the analysis in Lemma 3 to show that for a large enough, such an equilibrium would still hold. Note that the higher is ; the higher are the gains from signalling which implies that 1 must decrease and admits the lowest value for = 1.
For small enough ; we might now have a negative lhs for all 1 b d; thus due to the monotonicity of the lhs in 1 ; the equilibrium must have accurate signalling. The equilibrium condition for the accurate signalling equilibrium is:
For a small enough this now can be an equilibrium and in particular in the limit when ! 0; we have that !^ :
Due to the linearity in ; it is easy to see that there exists 0 such that for all > 0 there exists an equilibrium with excessive signalling, and moreover that 0 1 ( ) < 0: For < 0 there exists an equilibrium with accurate signalling, again with 0 ( ) < 0:
(ii) In the accurate equilibrium, all agents below b d must prefer D always to R, as in R they get a while in D they get some b in the …rst period. This is the same in the excessive signalling equilibrium for all agents below 1 : This establishes (ii).
(iii) Explained in the text.
(iv) We will now show that globaly, all agents prefer a high enough to a low enough :
We will show this result for extreme 0 s; speci…cally = 0 and = 1: By continuity and given (i), this holds for high enough and low enough 0 s: It is easy to show that all types at least weakly prefer = 1 to = 0 in D: Thus, weakly, the set of supporters must increase. We now show that indeed there are types that switch their preferences. Consider the type at b d and his di¤erence in utility between R and = 1:
From the proof of Proposition 4 we know that this type strictly prefers = 1 for all : On the other hand, when is small enough, the utility of this type from = 0 approaches his utility from R. By continuity, there exist a type > b d but close enough that switches to prefer D when increases.
Proposition 6: (i) For all equilibria with excessive signalling,
We therefore care about the sign of d 2 2(b a) d 1 r:
; and then we have
Thus we need to check the sign of
which is indeed the case and hence this expression is positive. We therefore have revenues increasing in 1 :
(ii) Now consider accurate equilibria, where the expression for the ritual cost is r = 2( (d
The revenues again are r( + (1 ) a a ) and the foc is
)) so we need to check the sign of ( + (1 )(
a ; which for a small is ( d + a = 3a 2d 3 : Note that for this to be negative for all we need to check at = b d: We then have 3a 2d 3b + 3d = 3a + d 3b which is negative when is not too large.
Appendix B: A hybrid religion
We now consider the game assuming that both rituals and information about behaviour in the …rst PD game are fully available. It will be simpler and more sensible to consider a slight change in timing, where the game would be as follows: in Period 0 agents are randomly matched to play the PD game. In Period 1 they can pay r; and in Period 2 they are matched again to play the PD game now with possibly two signals available about their opponent. 43 As usual, we are considering monotone equilibria, so that (i) those who do not signal at all defect for sure in any remaining PD game(s); (ii) those that pay r are a connected interval and those that cooperate are a connected interval and one of these intervals is nested in the other. (i) For some parameters, as in Example 1, the revenues of the church are higher in the R religion than in the hybrid religion.
To create a fair comparison, we consider r in the R religion that applies for one signalling period, as here. We then have to show that: (ii) In Example 1, the revenues of the church are higher in the R religion than in the hybrid religion.
(iii) This equilibrium does not exist in Example 2.
(iii) If we are limited to have r r 2 (where r is the level of r in the Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium) then this equilibrium cannot arise (to see why note that here 2 > b d and hence it must be that r < r ):
As a …nal comment note that the gist of our results is maintained. Speci…cally, the second type of equilibrium often does not hold, which implies that paying r is much more likely to be an accurate signal whereas signalling by discipline is more likely to be an inaccurate signal.
When comparing the hybrid religion to the "pure" religions it is the case that the R religion provides more coordination, whereas the D religion saves on cost, as in our main analysis.
7.3 Appendix C: "Belief Activation" re…nement Ritual-based religion: Suppose that individuals are not endowed with religious beliefs, but that they gain such beliefs only if they participate in rituals, i.e., pay the cost r. More speci…cally, individuals have "latent" types in [0; a] and this type will be activated when they pay r but not activated otherwise. Many religious organizations play an active role in shaping beliefs and invest time and e¤ort in advocating certain kinds of messages while censoring others. This assumption is therefore reasonable when considering religious organizations and it speci…cally …ts the Catholic religion where the rewards from good works were also conditioned on participation in rituals. The role of rituals in such an alternative model is therefore two-fold:
to endow individuals with beliefs favouring cooperation and to serve as a public signal.
Since this model involves a choice of beliefs, we need to add to the equilibrium concept a stability condition. Namely, an individual of type who in equilibrium had paid r and has activated her beliefs, will, given her current beliefs and other equilibrium behaviour; prefer to do so than not pay r and defect against all. Similarly an individual who had not paid r and had not activated her beliefs, prefers to do so than to acquire beliefs and sometimes cooperate, given her current beliefs (e.g., = 0) and equilibrium behaviour of others. For more on this stability notion and the robustness of the results to other stability notions, see Levy and Razin (2012) .
The assumption on belief activation implies that whoever does not participate in rituals, has no beliefs in favour of cooperation, and will therefore defect. Together with the stability notion above, it implies that as in our model, equilibria can only be as described in Lemma 2 with exactly the same equilibrium conditions speci…ed in the text, and that such equilibria indeed exist.
Discipline-based religion: as above, suppose that individuals have "latent"types in [0; a] and that they have to choose to activate these beliefs prior to the two period PD game. As both Calvin and Luther called for believers to return back to the scriptures and read the bible themselves, suppose that it is costless and private to activate beliefs, and as a tie-breaking rule, that if individuals forecast that their utility from activating beliefs and not activating beliefs is the same, then they do not activate their beliefs. Again, the equilibrium will demand that individuals who did not activate their beliefs, given all other equilibrium behaviour, will be happy with this decision and vice verse.
With this assumption one can show that there will be no individual who defects in the …rst period and cooperates later on. Thus only monotone equilibria can arise as described in Lemma 2. Moreover, these equilibria indeed exist in this alternative model as it is optimal for all those who defect not to acquire beliefs (and hence defect from that point onwards).
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